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EVIDENCE
EDGAR L. MoRis*
In this year's Survey the subject has been divided between Civil
and Criminal Evidence, this note will be concerned with the civil
aspects of the subject only.
Our Supreme Court has followed established and well-understood
precedents which accounts for the paucity of material available for
review here. No legislation of any significance in this field was
adopted by the General Assembly which would merit notice here.
Inference
In the trial of a case it is to be expected that the litigants will
produce all evidence at their disposal or under their control to sus-
tain their respective positions. Failure to produce such evidence
gives rise to the inference that if produced, it would be adverse to
the theory of their contention.
The failure to call witnesses in Hicklin, et al. v. Jeff Hunt Machin-
ery Company,' was discussed by our Supreme Court. It appears
that the action was brought against the repairer of heavy machinery
for automobile passenger's wrongful death when a pulley or sheave
fell from the machine being transported and entered an oncoming
automobile striking the decedent. From a judgment for the plain-
tiff, defendant appealed. The court properly pointed out that the
witnesses who could have shed most light on the condition of the
pulley and the cotter pin holding it were not called. The unexplained
failure of the appellant to call these witnesses during the trial war-
rants the inference that their testimony, if presented, would have
been unfavorable to its theory of the cause of the accident.
2
It is well settled that negligence may be established by cir-
cumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence, and that in a
civil case the law does not require proof to a certainty. Eick-
hoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E. 2d 153, 141
A.L.R. 1010. We think the circumstances reasonably warrant
the inference either that the cotter pin was not in place when
OB,S. in C.E., Clemson College, 1933- LL.B., Georgetown University, 1938- member
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1. 85 S.E. 2d 739 (S.C. 1955).
2. Wingate v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 204 S.C. 520, 30 S.E. 2d 307
(1944); Robinson v. Duke Power Co., 213 S.C. 185, 48 S.E. 2d 808 (1948);
Padgett v. Southern Railway Co., 216 S.C. 487, 58 S.E. 2d 895 (1950).
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the machine left the shop or was in a defective condition and
should not have been used. Negligence in causing the fall of
the sheave could be based on either fact.
Another case involving the non-production of a witness under
different circumstances may tend to clarify the application of the
rule that ". . where a party fails to produce the testimony of an
available witness on a material issue in the cause, it may be inferred
that the testimony of such a witness, if presented, would be adverse." 3
In the case of Johnson v. Windham, et al.,4 which involved an ac-
tion against a remainderman and a life tenant for specific performance
of an alleged written contract for the sale of realty, it appeared that
the owner of the life tenancy was not shown by the testimony to
have had any knowledge of the contract purporting to sell her in-
terest. The court said that since there was no scintilla of evidence
that she was advised or privy to the contract, it followed that her
failure to testify would not support the inference that her testimony
would be adverse to her position at the trial. In other words, to
support an inference, a foundation must be established which would
compel as a logical conclusion the inference sought.
In Turner v. Wilson, et al.,5 the question of inference was in-
volved. It appeared that the plaintiff became ill of food poisoning
allegedly caused by eating an unwholesome sandwich manufactured
by the defendant and brought an action for damages. The court
said that the mere fact that the plaintiff became ill after eating the
sandwich did not necessarily show that it was unwholesome. The
plaintiff ate other food at the same time. However, it was pointed
out that the only item eaten in common by many others at different
locations who likewise suffered food poisoning on the same night
were those who ate the same kind of sandwich as plaintiff, all of
these sandwiches being manufactured by the defendant. From these
circumstances it could be reasonably concluded that the deviled egg
sandwiches were unwholesome. "When under the same conditions,
several persons who have eaten the same food become similarly ill
an inference may be warranted that the food which all had eaten was
unwholesome and was the cause of their illness." 6 Testimony of this
character was given weighty consideration in Hollis v. Armour &
Co.7 and Boylston v. Armour & Co.8
3. Ex parte Hernlen, 156 S.C. 181, 153 S.E. 133, 69 A.L.R. 443 (1930).
4. 224 S.C. 502, 80 S.E. 2d 234 (1954).
5. 86 S.E. 2d 867 (S.C. 1955).
6. Johnson v. Kanavos, 296 Mass. 373, 6 N.E. 2d 434, 436 (1937).
7. 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E. 2d 681 (1939).
8. 196 S.C. 1, 12 S. E. 2d 34 (1940).
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The court, in discussing the different locations of the consumers
of the sandwiches, went into the question of circumstantial evidence,
which is of interest here.
If all of those becoming ill had worked in the same mill, it
might be plausibly argued that the unwholesome condition of
the food could with equal likelihood be the result of external
causes operating thereon after the sandwiches had left defen-
dant's control. But they worked at different mills, in one of
which there was a different retailer. It would be rather singu-
lar if these sandwiches were improperly handled and cared for
in all three mills on the same night. Then, too, there is no evi-
dence that any of the mill employees had previously been made
ill from eating sandwiches. Although the question is a close
one, we think the circumstances are strong enough to show a
reasonable probability that this food was unwholesome when sold
by defendant. Under our rule of circumstantial evidence, this
is sufficient.9
In Odom v. Weathersbee, et al.,10 the court said:
In civil actions the law does not require proof to a certainty,
but it is enough if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the mind
and conscience of the court and the jury of the reasonable proba-
bility of the truth of the allegations. Steele v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 103 S.C. 102, 87 S.E. 639.
Also, the court said of inferences:
It does not follow that because it may appear from the testi-
mony that an injury may have been caused in one of two ways,
that the jury may not be allowed to determine in what way it
was caused, if the facts and circumstances in evidence warrant
a reasonable inference that it was caused in any way alleged in
the complaint for which the defendant would be liable. Worrel
v. S. C. Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 195 S.R. 638, 641 (1938).
Statutes
In Peters v. Double Cola Bottling Co., et al.,11 an action was
brought for damages allegedly received when plaintiff consumed a
portion of soft drink which had been bottled by defendant and
which allegedly contained insects and foreign ingredients, it was held
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 225 S.C. 253, 81 S.E. 2d 788 (1954).
11. 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E. 2d 710 (1954).
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that it was not essential for the plaintiff to plead the Pure Food and
Drug Act,' 2 when a reading of the complaint indicated that the ac-
tion was brought under the terms of that Act as well as under the
common law, citing Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.'s
Judicial Notice
In Thompson v. Bre'weri4 the court said: "We add it is common
knowledge that a driver cannot bring his automobile to a stop from
a speed of 55 to 60 miles per hour within a distance of 65 feet."
In Sylvan v. Sylvan Brothers, Inc.,15 the court, in denying a busi-
ness executive's claim for workmen's compensation arising out of a
fall while going home with business papers in his pocket, said:
It is common knowledge that business executives, profession-
al men and white-collar employees generally, and sometimes
others, take work home for their convenience; and it is for their
convenience. The journey to and fro is not in the course of
employment because the main purpose of it is to go home or to
return to the place of employment and the journey would be
made irrespective of the homework.
In Joiner v. Fort1 6 the court said that churches are so closely
interwoven with our community life that it is to be expected that
one or more members of the congregation will enter the building any
day during the week- "So predominant is the use of the facilities
of a church that evidence is not required to support anticipation of
entry, but common knowledge is sufficient upon which to base the
necessary foresight." The case involved a suit against a contractor
who was doing work in the church and the plaintiff sustained injur-
ies by stepping into an open vent left by defendant. The principle
mentioned by the court was in answer to defendant's contention that
the plaintiff's use was not a foreseeable contingency.
In a suit by a railroad company to enjoin and set aside an order by
the State Public Service Commission requiring a railroad to enlarge
a station platform, the court said ". . . it is common knowledge in
this State, and a practice well known to this court and no doubt to
the Commission, that farmers and buyers frequently place their cot-
ton on railroad company platforms for sampling and temporary stor-
age preliminary to actual shipment."' 7
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 32-1451 et seq.
13. 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E. 2d 641, 127 A.L.R. 1185 (1940).
14. 225 S.C. 460, 82 S.E. 2d 685 (1954).
15. 225 S.C. 429, 82 S.E. 2d 794 (1954).
16. 226 S.C. 249,48 S.E. 2d 719 (1954).
17. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. The Public Service Commission of
South Carolina, et al., 226 S.C. 136, 84 S.R. 2d 132 (1954).
1955]
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Domicile
The case, Peoples National Bank of Greenville v. Manos Bros., Inc.,
et al.,18 involved the validity of a divorce granted in the State of
Georgia and the legitimacy of certain persons. The question of domi-
cile was also a matter in issue. It was claimed that the husband left
the wife and returned to Greece and later, on return to this county,
he prosecuted a divorce action in Georgia and allegedly served the
wife by a publication. To contest the validity of the divorce and to
demonstrate that the husband was never domiciled in Georgia, a de-
position of an attorney attesting to the fact that the husband's name
did not appear on the tax records of the Georgia County, nor on the
voter's list or the special city tax records, was introduced. When
the deposition was introduced it was objected to as not being the best
evidence in that the original books should be introduced. It was
held that the non-existence of an entry in a record book does not
require the production of the book for proof. 19' City directories
were then introduced to establish the fact that the husband's domicile
was in Greenville, South Carolina, during the years in question. The
court held that on the issue of domicile a city directory is admissible.
20
In connection with the use of city directories the court went on to
hold that a memorandum of their contents would not be admissible
if the books were available since the books themselves would be the
best evidence of what they contained.
18. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
19. 4 WIGORt, EVIDFNCE § 1244(5) (3d ed. 1940). Blair's Foodland v.
Shuman's Foodland, 311 Mass. 172, 40 N.E. 2d 303 (1942) ; Peters v. Adcock,
196 Ga. 118, 26 S.E. 2d 342 (1943); Christoffel v. U. S., 91 App. D.C. 241,
200 F. 2d 734 (1951). Cf. Greer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 180 S.C.
162, 185 S.E. 68 (1936).
20. 6 WIG or , EVIDIcZ § 1708 (3d ed. 1940). In re Gilbert's Estate, 18
N.J. Misc. 540, 15 A. 2d 111 (1940).
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